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Bank regulation in general and capital regulation in
particularare widelyperceivedashaving become stifferin
the 1990s. The stiffer regulatory environment in turn is
argued to have curtailedbank lending. This article deter-
mines the extent to which capital standards changed in the
1990s and examines the relationship between capitalposi-
tions and the bank lending. The empirical results suggest
that capital standards did increase in the 1990s. The
analysis also shows that bank loan growth rates are
positively related to capital-to-assets ratios. Moreover,
sensitivity ofbanklending to capital positions appears to
have increasedinthe1990s.Regionally, capital regulation
likely had the mostpronounced effect on bank lending in
New England.
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Thephasinginofinternational, risk-basedcapitalstan-
dards and the growingconcern over the risk-exposure of
the deposit insurance systemare viewed as precipitating
stifferbankcapitalregulationinrecentyears. Thisstiffen-
ing of capitalregulationis arguedto have restrictedbank
lendingbeginningin 1990,and, thereby, contributed to a
credit crunch.
Consistent with this view, FederalReserve surveys on
bank lending practices find that many banks tightened
creditstandards in1990and1991 inpartduetothevolume
ofproblemloansandcapitalconstraints. Inaddition,some
recentstudiesfindapositive relationship between levels of
bankcapital andbankloangrowthin 1990(Furlong 1991,
Bernanke and Lown1991, andPeekandRosegren 1991).1
The evidence, however, doesnot indicatethe extentto
which the relationship between bank capital and bank
lending in recent years marks a change from the past.
Capital standards traditionally have been a component of
bankregulatorypolicy, andenforcement ofsuchstandards
couldbeexpectedtohave influenced lendingbyindividual
banks evenprior to 1990. Thepurposeof this studyis to
examine the extent to which bank capital regulationhas
changedin the 1990s andtheeffectthechangehashadon
the relationship between bank capital and lending. The
analysis in this paper differs from past studies by using





tory objective of creating microeconomic incentives for
banksthatareconsistentwithlimitingtheriskexposure of
the deposit insurance system. The second section com-
pareseffective capitalstandards amongbanksbysizeand
charteringauthorityandexamines howbankcapitalstan-
dards have changed. The empirical analysis in the third
sectionlooksathowtherelationship between thefinancial
conditions of banks and their lending has changed over
timeandwhethertheeffectsonbanklendingvarybybank
size and by geographic region.
IBaerandMcElravey (1992) findapositiverelationship betweenbanks'
capitalpositionsand growthratesin assets.
231. THE LINK
In the U.S. banking system, the roles of the federal
deposit insurance system and the bank regulatory agencies
parallel those of liability holders in private contracts. The
deposit insurance system bears financial liability, and the
regulatory agencies havemonitoring responsibilities anal-
ogous to those of private liability holders.
A major criticism of the current institutional arrange-
ment is that, while the roles may be parallel, the deposit
insurance system and the regulatory agenciesdonotneces-
sarily havethe same incentive as private liability holders.2
Nevertheless, regulatory measures are observed that at
least in form resemble those seen in private debt agree-
ments that are intended to control risk-taking.
The most obvious example is capital regulation, which
is analogous to private debt covenants constraining lever-
age. Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that equity
holders in general have an incentive to increase risk once
debt has been issued. One method for a firm to increase
risk is to increase its leverage. To control that incentive,
private debt contracts often include provisions limiting the
ability of a firm to dilute its capital position.
The importance of capital regulation in banking per se
is highlighted by Merton (1977) and the large number
of studies spawned by that study, which show that the de-
posit insurance guarantee is essentially a put option,
with the value varyingnegatively with a bank's capital-to-
asset position. The options model of deposit insurance
thus implies that, with subsidized deposit insurance, a
value-maximizing bank has an incentive to increase lev-
erage indefinitely, thus making it necessary for leverage
to be constrained by the enforcement of bank capital
requirements.
The enforcement of capital requirements can link a
bank'scapital position withitslending simplyaspart ofthe
process of abank meeting regulatory standards. Forexam-
ple, if bank equity is not perfectly elastic, a bank with too
little capital could attempt to improve its capital position
by reducing its size, and one wayto do that is to decrease
loans. Indeed, Keeley(1988)findsthat in the 1980s, banks
deficient in capital did adjust their capital positions in part
by growing more slowlythan other banks. More generally,
banks with stronger capital positionshavemore capacity to
expand loans and still meet regulatory capital standards.
2Tothe extent that the incentive structure differs, regulatory policy and
bank behavior will not necessarily coincide with what would be pre-
dicted from models of unregulated, uninsured banks. Indeed, Kane
(1989) argues that much of the blame forthe thrift crisis in the 1980sand
the demise of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporationfalls
on the nonmarket incentives structure faced by regulators as well as on
the incentives inherentin the deposit insurance system forinstitutionsto
take risk.
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The recent adoption of risk-based capital standards for
banks could reinforce the link between a bank's financial
condition and its investment decisions. Forexample, when
determining the levelof risk-adjusted assets, a zero weight
is given to assets with no default risk, such as Treasury
securities, while riskier assets, such as loans, are given
higher weights.> As a result, for a given level of capital,
a bank can increase its risk-based capital-to-asset ratio
simplybyreducing the volumeof loans held in its portfolio
and acquiring Treasury securities. Such an adjustment
would tend to reduce the growth rate of loans.4
The options model of the deposit guarantee also sug-
gests another regulatory rationale for linking leverage and
the growth of risky assets such as loans. Merton shows
that the value of the deposit insurance guarantee is posi-
tivelyrelated to the degree of asset or nonleveragerisk of a
bank. This implies that regulatory policy that takes into
account the liability of the insurance system can be ex-
pected to extend effort to control nonleverage risk.
Moreover,FurlongandKeeley(1989)showthattheposi-
tive effect of a rise in nonleverage risk on the value of the
insurance guarantee increases with a bank's leverage.That
is, with higher leverageand mispriced deposit insurance, a
bank would have more incentive to expand nonleverage
risk. This suggests that regulatory policy should be most
concerned with the expansion of nonleverage risk by
institutions with the least amount of capital.
Two ways a bank can increase nonleverage risk are to
grow and acquire loans (or other assets) that add to its
overall risk or to adjust the composition of its existing
portfolio toward riskier assets such as loans. From a
regulatory perspective, a link between loan growth and
leverage could be rationalized as one way of limiting a
bank's ability to exploit the insurance system through
either of these two options. Loan growth would be more
restricted at banks with less capital since they would have
the greatest incentive to increase nonleverage risk."
3Risk-based capital standards assign risk weights to all bank assets. The
weights are determinedbyconsideringthe credit(default) riskof assets.
For example, the lowest risk category includes cash and U.S. Treasury
securities, and has a zero weight, which means holdings of these
securities donot add to a bank's risk-adjusted assets. The highest risk
category includes most loans to private entities (but not home mortgage
loans) and has a weight of 100 percent. The standards also account for
creditrisk of off-balance sheet activities such as interest rate swaps and
stand-by letters of credit.
4Under the risk-based standards, banks also are subject to a leverage
ratio requirement, which is a ratio of capital to balance sheet assets
including Treasury Securities. Thus, a bank would not be able to
increase leverage indefinitely by shifting to assets with a zero weight.
5Bemanke and Gertler (1987) show that the financial condition of
uninsured, unregulated banks also could be expected to affect their
lending. In their model, banks invest inloans (risky assets) because they
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Capital regulation has always played some role in bank
regulatory policy. Over thepast severalyears, however, the
theoretical arguments connecting capital and bankrisk and
the more concrete evidence of the problems in the thrift
and banking industries, which ultimately led to thedemise
of the FSLIC and the "recapitalization" of the bank
insurance fund, heightened the awareness of the impor-
tance of equity in banking.
This awareness was reflected in the adoption of explicit
minimum regulatory capital ratios for all but the largest
banks in 1981 and the subsequent raising and extending
of the minimum ratio to all banks in 1985. In an evalua-
tion ofthe effects of thechangesincapital standards during
the first half of the 1980s, Keeley (1988) finds that they
were effective in raisingcapital-to-assetratios forpublicly
traded banks with low capital ratios.
Since 1985, additional important steps have been taken
toplace capitalregulation atthecenter ofregulatory policy.
One in particular was the adoption of risk-based capital
standards by the bank regulatory agencies." The phase-in
of these standards started in 1990and it will be completed
at the end of 1992. When fully phased in, the risk-based
standards will require banks to maintain a minimum 4
percent ratio of Tier 1capital to risk-adjusted assets, and
an 8 percent ratio for Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital. To be
consideredwell capitalized, however, abank wouldhaveto
exceed the minimum ratios." Tier 1 capital consists pri-
marily of common equity, while Tier 2 capital can include
have more information on loans than do liability holders and the
informationcannotbe transferred. Given the information asymmetry on
risky investments, the capital of a bank is necessary to assure liability
holders that the bankwouldbe able to makegood on thepromised return
todepositors. Assuminga bank's capital equity is notperfectly elastic, a
negative shock to a bank's capital could impair its ability to meet its
obligation to liability holders unless the bank also shifts its investment
portfolio toward riskless assets and away from risky assets. This sa~s
that the adequacy of a bank's capital would affect the makeup of Its
portfolio.
6The prominence of capital regulations was heightened further by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of
1991, which directs the regulatory agenciesto use the risk-based capital
standards to trigger specific regulatory responses in a protocol called
"prompt corrective action." Under the protocol, as a bank's capital
falls, the bank faces more restrictions and the regulatory agencies have
less flexibility in dealing with the bank.
"Usingthe currentrisk-basedcapital standards, theFDICIAestablished
fivecategories that are intended to reflect banks' capital adequacy. The
fivecategories are: (I) well-capitalized, which includes institutions that
significantly exceed the capital requirements; (2) adequately cap-
italized, which includes banks meeting all requirements; (3) under-
capitalized, which includes banks not meeting at least one capital
requirement; (4) significantly undercapitalized, which includes banks
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subordinated debt and such instruments as cumulative
perpetual preferred stock.
Since the current capital standards use a risk-adjusted
measure of assets, the capital requirements under the
current standards are not directly comparable to ratios
associated with the standards applied in the 1980s. How-
ever, it is still possible to evaluate whether the new stan-
dards have led to more stringent regulatory regimes in
terms ofleading banks toholdmore capital relativeto what
they held in the past. 8 To do so, this study examines the
impact of regulatory policy on banks' ratios of equity-
capital to total assets. This study assumes that banks have
target equity-capital-to-asset ratios and that they adjust to
those targets gradually over time. The adjustment process
for bank i can be written as:
kj, t-kj, t-1 = a(ktt-kj, t-1),
where, k is the actual capital-to-assetratio, k* is the target
ratio, and a is the rate of adjustment.
In the model, it is assumed that capital regulation is
binding and that k* reflects thelevelofcapital theregulator
views as appropriate given the nonleverage risk of the
bank.? The target ratio, however, is not necessarily a
minimumratio or arequired regulatoryratio. Forexample,
if there are regulatory costs imposed on a bank that has a
ratio below the level deemed appropriate by the regulator,
the bank may choose to hold additional capital as a buffer
against shocks to equity. The target ratio for the bank also
would reflect such a buffer. Finally, the partial adjustment
process implies that adjusting capital is costly.
With data on the actual capital ratios, the expression
above was usedto estimate average target ratios and rates
of adjustment for various groupings of banks. Averagetar-
getratios and adjustmentparameters wereestimated forall
banks, for large and small banks separately, and for na-
tional and state chartered banks. If capital regulation
became stiffer in 1990, the average target ratios or rates of
adjustment would be expected to have increased.
The data used for estimation are from year-endCall Re-
ports for commercial banks over the period 1985 through
well below at least one capital requirement; and (5) critically under-
capitalized, which includes banks falling below a predetermined crit-
ical capital level.
8A general shift in bank portfolios could complicate comparisons over
time. In recent years; the most obvious shifts in banking have been to
Treasury securities and home mortgages. Under the risk-based stan-
dards, these assets haveweights oflessthan 100percent and an increase
in their relative importancein bank portfolios could mask ashifttomove
stringent capital regulation.
9In recent years, it is possible that some banks have been impelled to
improve capital positions by market pressures rather than byregulatory
requirements.
251991.The data are for banks with assets of $100 millionor
more. Banks that acquired other banks in particular years
are excluded from the sample for those years.I?
The results from estimating the capital ratio adjustment
equation forthe various groupings of banks are reportedin
Table 1. The estimation procedure corrects for hetero-
skedasticity along the lines of White (1980).The figures in
the first column represent estimates of the average target
ratios and rates ofadjustmentfor all banks in the sample.11
The results show that for the period 1985-1989 the target
capital-to-asset ratio was about 7.2percent. Forthe 1990-
1991period, the ratio increased to about 8.8 percent. The
increase in the ratio is statistically significant, and is
consistent with a shift to a more stringent regulatory
regime after 1989.
The estimate of the average adjustment factor also
increases for the 1990-1991 period. However,the decrease
is not statistically significant. Thus, while effective capital
lO'fhe sample also excludes banks like credit card banks that do not
engagein a broad array of banking activities. The sample also excludes
banks with negative capital-to-asset ratios or ratios greater than one
half.
llNonlinear adjustment equations also were estimated. The results
regarding changes in capitalregulation are essentiallythe same as those
shown in table 1. The estimated target ratios, however, are about a
percentage point lower across the board.
standards appear to have increased, the rate of adjustment
in capital ratios for banks as a group is not indicative of
more vigorous enforcement of the new standards.
The table also reports statisticsby banksize and charter.
Under bank asset size, the target ratios are higher for
smallerbanks than forlarger banks. This is consistentwith
the view that smaller banks are required to hold more
capital to offset their tendency to be less diversified and,
thus, have higher nonleverage risk than larger banks. 12
On the other hand, the adjustment parameters are higher
for the large banks. This would be the case if regulators
enforced capital regulations more stringently for the larger
banks. It also could be the case if capital requirements
were binding more frequently for large banks than for
small banks.
In terms of changes in regulatory policy,the targetratios
increased for both large and small banks after 1989. The
increase is statistically significant for small banks, which
is consistent with an escalationin the stringency of capital
regulation for those banks. The adjustment parameter for
the sample of small banks declined slightly, though the
12Por example, results in Laderman, Schmidt, and Zimmerman (1991)
suggest that small banks tend to lend in local markets and to have less
diversified portfolios.
Table 1
Target Capital-to-Asset Ratios and Adjustment Parameters
ByAsset Size ByCharter
Thrget $100 million $1 billion
Ratio All banks to $1 billion ormore Difference State National Difference
1990-1991 0.0880** 0.0923** 0.0740** 0.0183t 0.0961** .0822** 0.0139
1985-1989 0.0718** 0.0733** 0.0610** 0.0123** 0.0749** .0664** 0.0085**
Difference 0.0162** 0.0191** 0.0130t 0.0212* .0158**
Adjustment
Parameter
1990-1991 0.0738** 0.0561** 0.1474t -0.0913 0.0445 0.1154** -0.0709
1985-1989 0.0762** 0.0740** 0.1268* -0.0529 0.0964** .0466** 0.0498
Difference -0.0024 -0.0179 0.0206 -0.0519 .0688:1:
* significant at 5 percent level
** significant at I percent level
t significant at 10percent level
:I: significant at 6 percent level
26 Economic Review / 1992, Number 3change is not significant. The target ratio and the adjust-
ment parameter both increased for large banks after 1989,
but only the change in the target ratio is statistically
significant. The evidence, is then supportive of thehypoth-
esis that capital regulation systematically became more
stringent for the large banks.
Looking at banks bytype of charter, the increases in the
targetratios after 1989arepositiveand significantforstate--
chartered and nationally chartered banks. Based on the
changes in the target ratios, the shift in capital regulation
was about the same for state-chartered banks as it was for
nationally chartered banks, with the difference not statis-
tically significant. The changes in the adjustment param-
eters, however, are consistent with more of a tightening of
regulatory policy for the national banks. The adjustment
parameterfor the sample ofnational banks increased, with
the change significant at the 6 percent level. For the state-
chartered banks, the estimated adjustment parameter de-
clined, but the change wasnotsignificant. In evaluatingthe
overall stringency of regulatory policy it can be noted that
the level of the target ratio tends to be higher for state-
chartered banks.13
III. CAPITAL REGULATION AND BANK LENDING
Overall, the results in Table 1 indicate that capital
regulationhas been more stringentinrecent years, whichis
consistent with regulatory policy that is increasingly con-
cerned with the soundness ofthedeposit insurance system.
The earlier discussion also suggests that such regulatory
concerns could be expected to lead to a positive relation
between the capital position of a bank and its rate of loan
growth. The analysis in this section focuses on this rela-
tionship. Inparticular, it examines whethera bank's capital
position affects its lending and whether that relationship
has been affected by the shift in regulatory regime sug-
gested by the results in the previous section.
The model used is a reduced form equation for the
growth in bank loans:
10g(Li,.ti;t-I) = f[g(ki,t-Ilkt t), Xi, t' ei,t].
This expression says that the growth rate of loans at a
given bank depends on the level of the actual capital ratio
relativetothe target ratio, a set ofvariablesX, whichrepre-
sents other supply and demand factors, and an error term.
If capital regulation affects bank lending, loan growth
would be expected to be positively related to the spread
between the actual and the target capital ratios. If the
change in regulatory regime over the past few years has
13This result holds up even when controlling for bank size.
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contributed to slowerbank loan growth, the positive effect
of the spread in the capital ratios on bank loan growth
would be expected to have increased.
The other supply and demand variables included in the
empirical analysis are the growth rate in personal income
for the state in which the bank operates, a bank's ratio of
current loans to total loans, and a bank'sratio oftotal loans
to assets. The income variable is intended to control for
general economic conditions faced by a bank and is ex-
pected to have a positive relation with loan growth. The
ratio of current loans also could be an indicator of the
economic environment in which a bank operates. 14 A
higher ratio could be indicative of a stronger economic
environment and could be associated with higher loan
growth. This variable also could capture regulatory effects
on a bank. Holding capital constant, banks with higher
ratios of current loans should be viewed as being stronger
financially. Ifso, the current loan ratio would be expected
to havea positive relationship with loan growth. The other
variable, the ratio of total loans to assets, is meant to
control for the capacity of a bank to boost loan growth by
shifting out of other assets in its portfolio. In this regard,
the ratio would be expected to havea negative relationship
with loan growth. Again, the effect of the loan-to-asset
ratio on loan growth may reflect regulatory influences. All
else equal, bank regulators could view banks with higher
loan-to-asset ratios as being less financially sound and,
therefore, may tend to limit the loan growth of such banks.
The basic equation used in estimation is:
In(Li,.tt.; t-I) = C + BIln(INCi,/INCi,t-I)
+ B2ln(PIL)i, t-I
+ B3ln(LlA);, t-I
+ B4ln(k;, t-Ilkt t) + e;, t'
where:
L is total loans
INC isthe leveloftheincome in the statein whicha bank
operates
P is current loans
A is total assets
k is the actual equity capital-to-asset ratio, and
k* is the target equity capital-to-asset ratio.
The target ratios are derived from the capital adjustment
equation discussed earlier.IS The targets differ by size
14These are loans that are less than 30 days past due and accruing
interest.
15The estimates of k* from a nonlinear adjustment equation also were
used in the loan growth equation. The statistical results are essentially
the same as those in Tables 2 through 4.
27ofbankand bytime period. Averagetargetswere estimated
separately for small banks ($100 million to $1 billion
in assets) and large banks ($1 billion or more in assets)
for the 1985-1989 period and the 1990-1991 period.
Lagged values were used for P/L and LIA to avoid pos-
sible simultaneityproblems. Once again, the interval used
is one year, and the estimation procedure corrects for
heteroskedasticity.
The loan growth equation was estimated overthe period
1985 through 1991.The first column ofTable 2 shows that
the coefficients on state income growth and the qualityofa
bank's portfolio are positive and highly significant. The
loan-to-asset ratio has a negative effect but is not statis-
ticallysignificant.
More central to the focus of this paper, the capital
position variable, measured by the ratioof a bank's actual
leverage to its target leverage, has a positive and statis-
tically significant effect on bank loan growth. This is
consistentwith capital regulation having an effect on bank
lending. The results for loan quality and the loan-to-asset
ratio also may reflect regulatory influences on bank lend-
ing. Overall, these results supportthe view that regulatory
policy does limit the loan growth of banks in weaker
financial condition.
The last two columns in the table provide evidence on
the shift in the behaviorof banklendinginrecentyears and
its possible relationship to bank capital regulation. In the
second column, the shift in bank loan growth is measured
bythe coefficienton the bivariate dummy variable D90-91,
whichtakes a value of 1in 1990and 1991and a valueof 0 in
the earlier years. The coefficient shows a negative and
statistically significantshift in the average growth rate of
Table 2
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28 Economic Review / 1992, Number3loans in the 1990-1991 period. This result is consistent
with the widely held view that bank lending wasunusually
weak in 1990 and 1991.
Totestfor a change in the effectsofcapital regulation, in
the third column D90-91 is interacted with the log of the
ratio of actual leverage to target leverage. The results
indicate that thecapitalposition ofbanks hadapositiveand
statistically significant effect on bank lending evenin the
second half of the 1980s. This is consistent with other
evidence that regulatory policy was emphasizing capital
regulation during that period. The connection between
capital regulation and bank lending thenis not aphenome-
non that arose only in the 1990s.
That relationship, however, does appear to have inten-
sified considerably in the past few years. The coefficient
for the interacted capital position.variable and the dummy
variable D90-9l is highly significant and points to a
relatively large increase in the sensitivity of bank loan
growth to capital positions. Overall, the coefficient on the
capital position variable is justabout three times larger for
the period 1990-1991 than for the period 1985-1989.
Measured from the average target values, a 0.01 drop in a
bank's capital ratio would haveloweredits loan growth for
a year byan estimated 0.3 of a percentage pointduring the
second half of the 1980s. In the 1990-1991, the same
decline in the capital ratio would have led to an estimated
0.8 of a percentage point drop in loan growth.
The finding that bank lending has become more sensi-
tive to capital positions is consistent with a shift to a more
stringent regulatory regime in the 1990s.16 The difference
in the coefficient on D90-91 between columns (2) and (3)
also suggests that the shift in regulatory regime relating
to capital regulation may account for part, but not all,
of the unusually slow bank loan growth in the 1990 and
1991.The unexplained portion could be due to differences
in the behavior of bank lending during recessionary peri-
ods, special economic factors such as the condition of the
commercial real estate sector, or perhaps more general
regulatory influences on bank lending that were not tied
directly to capital positions.
Bank Size
To determine how lending may have been affected at
different size banks, Table 3 reports pooled cross-section
regression results in which separate coefficients are esti-
mated for large and small banks. The coefficients on state
16The loangrowthequationalsowasestimatedallowing forshiftsinthe
relationship betweenloangrowthandeachoftheexplanatory variables.
This had virtually no effect on the change in the coefficient for the
capitalregulationvariable.
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income growth indicate that loan growth at small banks is
more sensitive to local market conditions. This is not
surprising, since bigger banks can be expected toengage in
more lending regionally, nationally, and even interna-
tionally. Lending by small banks and large banks is about
equally sensitive to the quality of loan portfolios.
The effect of the loan-to-asset variable also is different
for small and large banks. The effect for small banks is
what would be expected for banks with relatively con-
strained assetlliability management options,such as rely-
ing mainly on local, retail deposits. That would make
smaller banks with higher loan-to-asset ratios less able to
expand lending. The result for smaller banks also is
consistent with regulatory policy that tries to constrain
nonleverage risk.
Forlarge banks, however, the coefficientfor theloan-to-
asset ratio is positive, though only marginally significant.
One reason for the difference may be that large banks have
accessto national and eveninternationalmoneyand capital
markets, sotheirability to expand loans is less constrained
by the makeup of their existing portfolios. Without this
constraint, it may be that the portion of assets invested in
loans is an indication of a bank's general investment
strategy; banks with high ratios lend more and so tend to
have faster loan growth. This is not, however,the relation-
ship that earlier was argued would be expected if this
variable were capturing the effects of regulatory policy
concerned with controlling nonleverage risk.
The main focus of this analysis is on.theeffects of capi-
tal regulation. The results in Table 3 show that lending
by large banks in general is much more sensitive to cap-
ital ratios relative to target ratios. This is true even for
the 1985-1989 period. In thatperiod, thecoefficient forthe
larger banks is positive and highly significant. In contrast,
the coefficient on the capital position variable is positive
but not statistically different from 0 for the small bank
sample. These results are consistent with the evidence in
Table 1 suggesting that capital regulation is more binding
for larger banks than it is for smaller banks.
In terms of the shift in regulatory policy, the coefficient
on the capital position variable interacted with the shift
dummy in the first column of Table 3 suggests that capital
regulation has become a factor for small banks in recent
years. The point estimate for the increase in sensitivity of
lending to capital positions is bigger for the large banks
than for the sample of small banks. However,the change
for large banks is not statistically significant.
The evidence, then, suggests that the capitalregulation
has shifted for small banks but perhaps not for larger
banks, at least not beyondincreases in target capital ratios
indicatedin Table1.At the sametime,these results suggest
that standards under the new capital regulation regime, as
29under the old, are relatively more binding for the larger
banks. Moreover, the larger unexplained decline in loan
growth in 1990-1991forlarge banks could reflecta shiftin
regulatory policy toward those banks relative to their
smaller counterparts.
Regional Effects
The financial condition of banks varies across geo-
graphic regions. The chart, for example, shows that in the
early 1990sbank capital positions weakened considerably
in NewEngland compared to other regions of the country.
The earlier finding of a positive relation between bank
capital positions and lending suggests that bank lending
should have been more adversely affected in the areas
experiencing greater weakness in capital. 17 However, the
variation in the financial conditions of banks also raises
the possibility that the shift in regulatory regime wasmore
pronounced in some geographic regions.
Table4 presents two sets of statistics relating to the shift
inthe sensitivity ofbank lending to capital positionsacross
regions. The first set consists of estimates from a pooled
cross-section time series in which the coefficients inthe
loan growth equation are constrained to be the same for
17In testimony to the U.S. Congress, Richard Syron, President of the
Federal ReserveBank of Boston, argues that the declinein bank capital
in the New England area was an important cause of the weakness in
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aThe differrence between the average of the quarterly data 1988/89
and 1990/91
banks in all regions, with the exceptions of the dummy
variableD90-9landthecapitalposition variableinteracted
with the dummy. To simplify the presentation, only the
figures measuring the shifts in the intercept and thecoeffi-
cient on the capital position variable are reported. The
geographic regions correspond to the Bureau of Economic
Analysis definitions. 18
The results suggest that the change in sensitivity ofbank
lending to capital positions may have been more pro-
nounced in some regions. Only three of the eight regions
show statistically significant increases, with the largest
change for the New England region. However, some shift
also may have occurred in the other regions. Forexample,
when the five regions not showing statistically significant
results in the second column of Table 4 are grouped
together, we can reject the hypothesis of no change in the
loan growth/capital position relationships after 1989.
In the pooled regression for all banks, it is possible that
systematic differences among regions prior to 1990 af-
fected the measured shifts in the loan growth equation.
Accordingly, the second set of statistics inTable4 is based
on separate cross-section time series regressions for each
region. Overall, the results show somewhatmore evidence
of a shiftin the effect ofbanks' capital positions thandothe
results for the pooled regression for all banks. The three
regions showing significant positive shifts in the coeffi-
18A1aska and Hawaii are included in the West.
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cient for the capital position variable in the first set of
statistics also dosointhe second set. One additional region
showingashiftintheloan growth/capital position relation-
ship is the Southeast. Another difference is that the Great
Lakes region showsamarginally significant increase in the
response of bank lending to capital positions in the sepa-
rate regression for that region.
The separate regressions still suggest regional differ-
ences in the shift in regulatory policy, again with the New
England region showing the largest increases in the sen-
sitivity of bank lending to capitalpositions. These results,
coupled with the data on the decline in capital positions,
highlight why the credit crunch in 1990~1991 is most
closely associated with developments in New England.
That region shows the largest decline in bank capital ratios
and the biggest increase in the sensitivity of lending to
capital positions in the 1990-1991 period.
The results for the Southwest region provide an interest-
ing comparison with those for the New England region.
The separate regression for the Southwest shows neither a
significant shift in the relationship between loan growth
and bank capital positions nor a negative intercept shift in
theloan growth equation after 1989. This may reflect the
improvement in capital positions of banks in the Southwest
as illustrated in the chart. More likely,these results reflect
the difference in timing of the problems hitting the banks
in the Southwest. In that region, the problems in the bank-
ing industry hit in the 1980s. As a result, bank loan growth
in the Southwest was already weak going into the 1990s.
The weakness in banking lending in the Southwest in the
1990-1991 period is reflected in the significant negative
shift in intercept in the first column of Table 4.
The evidence for the West also is interesting since it
suggests that bank lending became less sensitive to capital
positions in the 1990-1991period. Indeed, with thechange
in the sensitivity during the 1990-1991 period, the overall
effect of bank capital positions on lending was not statis-
tically significant for the West. This does not necessarily
mean that the region was unaffected by regulatory policy,
however.The regression results for the West do indicate a
significant downward shift in loan growth in 1990-1991,
which leaves open the possibility that regulatory policy
affected lending in the region. It is still possible that
regulatory policy had a dampening effect on lending; it is
just not evident that such influences were systematically
related to the bank capital positions in the area.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paperfindsthat loan growth forindividual banks is
positivelyrelated to theircapital-to-assetratios. The analy-
sis in this paper goes beyond that of previous studies by
31using a much broader sample of banks and examining how
the relation between capital positions and lending has
changed in recent years. The analysis shows increases in
both bank capital standards and in the sensitivity of bank
lending to capital positions in the early 1990s compared
with the second half of the 1980s. The apparent shift in
regulatory regime affected small banks as well as large
banks. The overall sensitivity of lending to capital posi-
tions was more pronounced during both periods for the
large banks in the sample. This result is consistent with
the view that capital regulation tends to be binding more
often for larger banks than forsmaller banks. The change
in the sensitivity ofbank lending to capital positions varies
regionally, with the New England region being the most
affected.
With regard to the so-called credit crunch in the 1990s,
the findings in this paper support the viewthat the increase
in effective capital standards and the actual decline in
capital positions ofsome banks contributed to slow loan
growth in the 1990-1991period. In addition, the increased
sensitivity of bank lending tocapital positions accountsfor
a portion of slower than normal bank loan growth in the
1990-1991 period. The impact of capital regulation on
lending likely was most pronounced in the New England
region, which experienced both the greatest decline in
bank capital ratios and the sharpest rise in sensitivity of
Table 4
Regional Effects
Total Loan Growth Regression
(1985-1991 )
PooledRegression For AllBanks Separate Regressions by Region
In (ki, t-llkf, t) In (ki, t-llkf, t)
R2 D90-91 oD90-91 D90-91 oD90-91 N
NewEngland 1.324 14.966 -5.300 20.53 0.311 790
(1.09) (4.88)** (-1.44) (3.31)**
Mideast -0.665 5.143 -6.079 4.310 0.118 2504
(-0.61) (1.20) (-4.62)** (0.90)
GreatLakes -1.205 3.044 -2.367 5.328 0.082 4104
(-1.73) (1.01) (-3.27) (1.62)
Plains -1.697 8.241 -0.281 9.783 0.103 1604
(-2.48)* (3.22)** (-0.36) (3.42)**
Southeast -3.586 1.724 -4.244 6.00 0.186 3597
(-8.46)** (1.09) (-8.84)** (3.59)**
Southwest -4.419 3.839 2.116 4.297 0.100 1924
(-2.73)** (1.09) (1.14) (1.12)
RockyMtn. -4.900 12.155 1.279 13.68 0.156 529
(-2.65)** (2.58)** (0.63) (2.71)**
West 0.521 -4.717 -4.538 -12.742 .063 1209
(0.38) (-0.95) (-2.52)* (-1.82>*
R2 0.135
N 16,261
NOTE: See note to Table2.
32 Economic Review I 1992, Number 3lending to bank capital positions. For banks nationally,
however,agood portionofthe slowerloangrowthin 1990-
1991 is not accounted for directly bymovements in capital
positions or by changes in capital regulation. The unex-
plainedportionmaybe due to thedifference inthebehavior
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